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IS THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE A
"FIDUCIARY' DUTY? DOES IT MATTER?
Christopher M. Bruner*
INTRODUCTION
In an article appearing in the Wake Forest Law Review several
years ago, I argued that Delaware's nascent corporate law duty of
"good faith" ought to be conceptualized as a component of the duty of
loyalty, the logic being that the former conceptual vessel could
contain no content not wholly redundant with the latter.1 This
position-strenuously advocated for years by then-Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine-was ultimately adopted by the Delaware Supreme
Court in its 2006 Stone v. Ritter opinion.2 In the same piece, I
further argued that Delaware ought to clarify the conceptual
boundary between the corporate director's duties of care and loyalty
by adopting a statutory provision "permitting the imposition of
monetary liability only for loyalty breaches, defined to include cases
involving financial conflicts of interest, other improper personal
benefits, conscious malfeasance, and conscious nonfeasance, the
latter category representing those cases [now] styled by the
Delaware courts as involving bad faith omission."3 This position-
clearly more controversial and far-reaching, effectively discarding
much of Delaware's multilayered and convoluted mode of analysis
for the duty of care 4 -has not been adopted by the Delaware General
Assembly.
* Professor of Law and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee
University School of Law. This Essay was presented at the 2013 Fiduciary Law
Workshop at Notre Dame Law School and benefited greatly from discussion in
that forum. For helpful comments and suggestions, many thanks to Evan
Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Andrew Gold, Lyman Johnson, Paul
Miller, David Millon, and Julian Velasco. All errors or omissions are, of course,
mine.
1. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and
the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1131 (2006).
2. 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (citing Strine to support this
conclusion); see also Bruner, supra note 1, at 1159-62 (examining Strine's
position); id. at 1184-86 (examining Stone v. Ritter in a postscript added before
press).
3. Bruner, supra note 1, at 1136 (emphasis omitted).
4. See id. at 1177-84.
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In this Essay I return to the topic, exploring further the merits
of this proposal as well as the conceptual and practical impediments
that might stand in the way-a reexamination prompted by
comparative work on corporate governance in common law
jurisdictions that I have undertaken in the intervening years.
Though not emphasizing the duty of care as such,5 this comparative
work brought to my attention a curious divergence in this area-
unlike the United States, other common law jurisdictions including
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada generally do not
conceptualize the duty of care as "fiduciary" in nature.6 While the
inquiry undertaken in this Essay focuses more intently on the
United States,7 I discuss this divergence because it vividly
demonstrates the noninevitability of characterizing the duty of care
as a "fiduciary" duty while simultaneously suggesting that there
may be practical utility in drawing a clear distinction between
duties of care and loyalty in this manner.
Indeed, this contrast between the U.S. approach and that of
other common law jurisdictions prompts some important questions
about Delaware's doctrinal structure. Specifically, has the evolution
of Delaware's convoluted framework for evaluating disinterested
board conduct-involving an articulation of a duty of care, which
was effectively negated by the business judgment rule, revived by
the "gross negligence" standard for overcoming the business
judgment rule, then negated again by statutory exculpation, yet
potentially revived again by statutory exceptions to exculpation8-
been facilitated by styling the duty of care a "fiduciary" duty? If so,
5. These works examine varying degrees of shareholder orientation in
common law jurisdictions and therefore focus on shareholders' governance
powers and the intended beneficiaries of board decision making. See generally
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD:
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013); Christopher M.
Bruner, Power and Purpose in the 'Anglo-American" Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT'L
L. 579 (2010).
6. On the United Kingdom, see, for example, PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND
DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 488-97 (8th ed. 2008); ALAN
DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW 300-01, 320-24 (2009); Nigel Banerjee,
Fiduciary Duties of Directors, in [79 Company Law] Butterworths Corp. Law
Serv. (LexisNexis Butterworths) 25.23-.49 (Dec. 20, 2012); Simon Graham,
The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence, in [79 Company Law] Butterworths Corp.
Law Serv., supra, at 1 24.207-.220. On Australia, see, for example, ROBERT P.
AUSTIN & IAN M. RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 364, 437-42
(14th ed. 2010). On Canada, see, for example, BRUCE WELLING, CORPORATE LAW
IN CANADA: THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES 327-31, 368 n.235 (3d ed. 2006); Paul B.
Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 McGILL L.J. 235, 256-59, 269-70, 281
(2011).
7. For a discussion of contextual challenges faced in the comparative
study of corporate governance-particularly where the aim is to identify
normatively superior modes of corporate regulation-see BRUNER, supra note 5,
at 13-27.
8. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1133-36.
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then what-if anything-ought Delaware lawmakers and judges to
do about this problem moving forward?
I argue that styling care a "fiduciary" duty has in fact impacted
the evolution of Delaware's duty of care in ways that are not
uniformly positive. Historically, the duty of loyalty has been more
aggressively enforced, while the duty of care has hardly been
enforced at all-the former approach aiming principally to reduce
conflicts of interest through probing analysis of "entire fairness,"
and the latter aiming principally to promote entrepreneurial risk
taking through a hands-off judicial posture embodied most clearly in
the business judgment rule. Conflation of these differing
circumstances and problems as "fiduciary duties" (plural) or as twin
reflections of a "fiduciary" concept (singular) has resulted in a
tendency toward overenforcement of the corporate director's duty of
care, periodically threatening to impair entrepreneurial risk taking
until arrested by a countervailing legislative or judicial response.
Additionally, the conflation of care and loyalty threatens to facilitate
erosion of the corporate director's duty of loyalty (a trend readily
discernible in noncorporate settings) by fueling the contractarian
argument that the sole utility of "fiduciary duties" is to fill gaps in
incomplete contracts-an argument suggesting that corporate
stakeholders ought to have the same latitude to "opt out" of loyalty
that they effectively possess with respect to care and that disloyalty
involves no greater moral stigma than any garden-variety breach of
contract.
While I ultimately concede that there may be no pressing
imperative to restyle the duty of care in nonfiduciary terms moving
forward-and that there may in fact be good reasons not to do so-I
conclude that the analytical problems described in this Essay can
otherwise be remedied only through a statutory provision that more
clearly distinguishes these differing duties and enforcement
strategies from one another, foreclosing their further conflation in a
categorical manner.
I. DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS' LIABILITY EXPOSURE IN DELAWARE
Delaware's doctrinal framework for duty of care analysis is
hardly a picture of clarity; in fact, as I have argued in prior work, it
is almost precisely the opposite. 9 Analytically, one begins with the
proposition that Delaware directors owe a duty of care, defined by
reference to the traditional reasonable prudence standard.10 This
9. For additional background on the doctrinal evolution described here,
see Bruner, supra note 1, at 1132-37, 1150-59.
10. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
("[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use
that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances."); see also Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review
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duty is substantially qualified in practical effect, however, by the so-
called "business judgment rule" ("BJR"), which insulates
disinterested decisions aimed at the company's best interests from
after-the-fact judicial scrutiny or monetary damages-a judicial
posture typically attributed to a desire to promote entrepreneurial
risk taking by foreclosing negligence-based liability threats, the
prospect of which might otherwise result in substantial risk
aversion.11 In Delaware, the BJR has been styled "a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."12
The Delaware Supreme Court explained in its 1984 Aronson v.
Lewis opinion that "directors have a duty to inform themselves,
prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them" and indicated that the BJR's
protection could be overcome by a showing of "gross negligence" in
this regard.13 Historically, however, the market's understanding
was that the BJR effectively barred recovery for breach-of-care
claims, rendering the Delaware Supreme Court's finding of gross
negligence in the approval of a merger in its 1985 Smith v. Van
Gorkom decision14 a quite literal shock to the business community.
The Delaware General Assembly reacted swiftly to the ensuing
uproar (and associated disruption to the directors and officers
liability insurance market) through the enactment of section
102(b)(7) in July 1986.15 This provision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law permits a Delaware corporation's charter to
include a "provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty," except where the director's conduct
involved loyalty breaches, "acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law,"
unlawful distributions, or transactions involving "an improper
personal benefit." 16  This provision has been broadly (and
accurately) understood from the beginning as a direct response to
the turmoil created by the Van Gorkom decision, permitting
of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 793-94 (1999) (observing that clear
Delaware authority to this effect was surprisingly sparse before the 1960s).
11. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-53 (Del.
Ch. 1996); see also infra Part IIV.
12. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
13. Id.
14. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
15. For a discussion of the events leading up to the passage of this
provision, see Bruner, supra note 1, at 1139-44.
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
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Delaware corporations to revert to the status quo ante one by one-
which most have in fact done.17
Section 102(b)(7)'s exceptions, however-suggesting through
separate enumeration that "good faith" meant something distinct
from "loyalty"-led to a long and tortured debate over the scope of
the "good faith" concept and its role in policing board conduct. The
principal impetus for this debate was the effort of enterprising
plaintiffs' lawyers to bring cases of omission-notably, alleged
oversight failures-within section 102(b)(7)'s "good faith" exception,
rendering damages available notwithstanding the adoption of an
exculpatory charter provision.18 This debate was not laid to rest
until 2006, when Stone v. Ritter established that good faith is a
component of loyalty and that imposing liability for a bad faith
omission requires meeting the exacting Caremark standard, under
which "only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight . . . will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability."19
There are two critical observations to draw from this history.
First, Delaware's doctrinal structure for evaluating the adequacy of
disinterested directors' conduct has, since the 1980s, continually
grown by accretion, piling complexity upon complexity, with each
development tending to augment disinterested directors' liability
exposure being undone by the next development. Second, at no
point have the courts or the Delaware General Assembly
meaningfully sought to distill this framework down to its essence.
To be sure, there are areas in which such a swinging-pendulum
dynamic could plausibly be described as refining the relevant
doctrinal structure over time.20  For example, in its takeover
jurisprudence, the Delaware Supreme Court broadly legitimated
target boards' use of defensive measures, including poison pills, 2 1
then carved back at the availability of such defenses in certain final-
period circumstances by imposing heightened duties on target
17. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1144-46, 1182-83 (noting that § 102(b)(7)
has led most Delaware corporations to adopt exculpatory charter provisions);
see also Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail
the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 381 (1988) (observing that the "trend began in the 1987
annual meeting season, when American corporations in great number sought to
implement the law's new liberality by seeking shareholder approval for opt out
provisions in articles of incorporation").
18. For a detailed discussion see Bruner, supra note 1, at 1150-73.
19. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)); see
also Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith in Revlon-Land, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
581, 584-89 (2010/11); Bruner, supra note 1, at 1184-86.
20. I am indebted to my colleague David Millon for suggesting the following
comparison.
21. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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boards, 22 and then provided guidance on how target boards could
avoid triggering such duties, thereby retaining their discretion to
implement defenses. 23 Whatever the substantive merits of this
approach to takeover regulation may be (regarding which
reasonable minds continue to differ),24 this approach nicely
illustrates the potential for a swinging-pendulum dynamic in case
law to refine the doctrine over time-a dynamic reflecting the
underlying logic of the common law method itself.25
The key for our purposes, however, is to observe that no such
process of refinement has unfolded in Delaware's duty of care
jurisprudence, where the dynamic would be more accurately
described as vacillation. Indeed, it is quite arguably (and ironically)
the case that, for the vast majority of Delaware corporations, the
developments described above net out to an overall degree of
liability exposure for disinterested directors that is not materially
different from the exposure faced by their forebears prior to Aronson
and Van Gorkom-which is to say, virtually none. Depicted as
vectors tending toward greater or lesser liability exposure, as the
case may be, the doctrinal landscape today looks something like the
following:26
LIABILITY EXPOSURE FOR DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS' CONDUCT
Caremark standard
"good faith" exception
§ 102(b)(7)
"gross negligence" standard
business judgment rule
duty of care
lesser liability greater liability
22. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986).
23. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53
(Del. 1990).
24. On the compatibility of Delaware's hostile takeover case law with
various theories of U.S. corporate governance, see Christopher M. Bruner, The
Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1395-408
(2008).
25. For a discussion of the scope and strength of "precedential constraint"
in common law cases, see Larry Alexander, Precedent, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 503 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
26. This figure updates the figure included in Bruner, supra note 1, at
1136. Note that while Delaware's BJR historically predated clear articulation
of a director's duty of care, it remains coherent today to present the duty of care
as analytically prior. See infra note 78.
1032 [Vol. 48
2013] CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
As the figure depicts, imposing a duty of care gave rise to the
possibility that disinterested directors could face monetary liability
exposure, but this theoretical possibility was effectively negated by
the BJR as applied until the 1980s. The broadly read "gross
negligence" standard announced in Aronson (and applied in Van
Gorkom), however, resurrected the possibility of such liability
exposure, but this renewed exposure was then itself effectively
negated by section 102(b)(7). The broadly read "good faith"
exception to section 102(b)(7) resurrected the possibility of monetary
liability exposure for disinterested directors yet again, but this form
of exposure was itself effectively negated by the exacting Caremark
standard (widely-and correctly-understood to be exceedingly
difficult for plaintiffs to meet).27
At the end of the day, the doctrinal framework for the duty of
care described above nets out to a virtual rejection of monetary
liability in the absence of a conflict of interest. Yet, the byzantine
complexity of this structure remains problematic for at least three
reasons: (1) it preserves traps for the unwary; (2) it continues to
invite wasteful litigation at multiple junctures; and (3) it preserves
the potential for further swings of the pendulum, toying with the
notion of liability exposure for disinterested directors pending
definitive (and inevitable) rejection of this possibility by courts or
the legislature, resulting in further growth by accretion following
the well-established pattern described above. The statutory
response described earlier would remedy this by, in essence, netting
the vectors once and for all, formally declaring the unavailability of
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care-a step that
would eliminate the need for a BJR in the context of director
liability (with its vague and troublesome "gross negligence"
standard), section 102(b)(7) (with its vague and troublesome "good
faith" exception and pointless reliance on one-off charter provisions),
and insurance coverage for directors' care exposure, all at once. 28
The remainder of this Essay explores whether styling the duty
of care a "fiduciary" duty may have facilitated the emergence and
growth of this framework and how recognition of such dynamics
ought to impact Delaware's response moving forward.
II. THE DISPUTED NATURE OF THE DUTY OF CARE
While reference to a director's "fiduciary duties" (plural) is
routinely employed as a convenient shorthand for corporate
directors' duties of care and loyalty in the United States, our
tendency to conflate the two in this manner is in fact unique-even
among the common law systems with which our own is most often
27. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1133-36; see also Bruner, supra note 19, at
584-89.
28. Bruner, supra note 1, at 1177-84.
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compared. 29 In the United Kingdom, for example, loyalty stands
alone as the "fiduciary duty" (singular). A U.K. director's duties, as
specified in the Companies Act 2006,30 would, to be sure, appear
broadly familiar to an American corporate lawyer. The director
must "act in accordance with the company's constitution" (its core
governance document),3' "promote the success of the company," 32
"exercise independent judgment,"33 avoid conflicts of interest (and
declare any that may arise),34 and, of course, "exercise reasonable
care, skill and diligence."35 The first several duties listed above are
all recognizable expressions of the duty of loyalty, 36 while the last
obviously represents the duty of care. When it comes to
enforcement, however, an important distinction is drawn between
them. Section 178 explains that the "consequences of breach" of
these various duties "are the same as would apply if the
corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied."37
The provision goes on to explain, then, that this means that all of
these duties, "with the exception of [the] duty to exercise reasonable
care, skill and diligence," are "enforceable in the same way as any
other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors."38 This
provision of the Companies Act preserves the traditional distinction
between breach of "fiduciary duty"-that is, the duty of loyalty-for
which "restitutionary or restorative remedies" are available, and
breach of the duty of care, for which the "standard remedy. . . is
29. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 3-12 (discussing the tendency to overstate
the similarities among the corporate governance systems of common law
jurisdictions).
30. c. 46, §§ 170-77 (U.K.).
31. Id. § 171(a).
32. Id. § 172(1).
33. Id. § 173(1).
34. Id. §§ 175-77.
35. Id. § 174(1).
36. As my characterization of these provisions suggests, I use the term
"loyalty" broadly to require not only avoidance of conflicts but also affirmative
commitment to advance the company's best interests. See generally Bruner,
supra note 1. This is the approach now endorsed by the Delaware Supreme
Court. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). It must be
acknowledged, however, that in fiduciary law more generally, the specific
content of the duty of loyalty remains contested. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The
Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
(forthcoming 2014) (assessing whether the fiduciary duty of loyalty "has any
essential content," and concluding that, "to a large degree, it does not"); Julian
Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1231, 1257-77 (2010) (arguing that debates regarding the status of "good
faith" vis-i-vis loyalty reduce to "semantics").
37. Companies Act § 178(1).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
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compensation to recompense the company for the harm caused to it
by the director's breach." 39
The rationale for singling out the duty of loyalty as the sole
"fiduciary duty" is straightforward. As Millett L.J. explains in the
UK Court of Appeal's 1996 decision in Bristol and West Building
Society v. Mothew40:
The expression "fiduciary duty" is properly confined to those
duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of
which attracts legal consequences differing from those
consequent upon the breach of other duties. Unless the
expression is so limited it is lacking in practical utility....
It is . . . inappropriate to apply the expression to the obligation
of a trustee or other fiduciary to use proper skill and care in
the discharge of his duties.41
As to which duties "are special to fiduciaries" and thereby "attract
those remedies which are peculiar to the equitable jurisdiction and
are primarily restitutionary or restorative rather than
compensatory," Millett concludes that the "distinguishing obligation
of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to
the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary."42
In Mothew, Millett makes two key analytical moves. First, the
descriptive term "fiduciary" is reserved for those duties "peculiar" to
those occupying this status, rather than applying more broadly to all
duties owed by someone in this position. 43 Second, the resulting
distinction between the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the
nonfiduciary duty of care is mapped onto the availability of
equitable remedies (available upon breach of the former but not the
latter). This view regarding the core distinction between duties of
care and loyalty-and the respective remedies available for their
breach-has enjoyed wide adherence among British practitioners
and academics alike.44 Moreover, Millett's analytical approach is
39. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 495; see also Banerjee, supra note 6,
25.29-.41; Graham, supra note 6, 24.217-.218.
40. [1998] Ch. 1 (Eng.).
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 18. In Mothew, declining to characterize the duty of care as
"fiduciary" had the effect of requiring the plaintiff building society to establish
causation in order to prevail in an action for damages against a solicitor who
failed to report a borrower's second mortgage in connection with the building
society's financing of a home purchase. See id. at 6-13.
43. Compare id. at 16, with Velasco, supra note 36, at 1277-305 (arguing
that "distinguishing among fiduciary duties based on the paradigms for
enforcement is most likely to lead to meaningful distinctions without risk of
confusion," an analytical approach assuming that all duties of one occupying
this status should be described as "fiduciary" in nature).
44. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 6, at 495 (discussing the views expressed in
Mothew and their implications); Banerjee, supra note 6, T$ 25.21-.49 (same);
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largely consistent with those prevailing in Canada and Australia as
well. 4 5 In Mothew, Millett endorses views expressed in Canadian
decisions that "to say that simple carelessness" amounts to breach of
fiduciary duty "is a perversion of words,"4 6 and that "not every legal
claim arising out of a relationship with fiduciary incidents will give
rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty."47 Likewise, Millett
endorses the view expressed in an Australian decision that "[t]he
director's duty to exercise care and skill has nothing to do with any
position of disadvantage or vulnerability on the part of the company.
It is not a duty that stems from the requirements of trust and
confidence imposed on a fiduciary."48 Millett emphasizes that this
core distinction between duties of care and loyalty "is not just a
question of semantics. It goes to the very heart of the concept of
breach of fiduciary duty and the availability of equitable
remedies." 49
Graham, supra note 6, 24.217-.218 (same). Cf. Peter Birks, The Content of
Fiduciary Obligation, 34 IsR. L. REV. 3, 35-36 (2000) (arguing that "care in the
affairs of the beneficiary is the very heart of the trustee's obligation," but
endorsing the outcome in Mothew and conceding that "[w]e might say that
[care] is not especially fiduciary," relative to loyalty). But see Andrew Burrows,
We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1
(2002) (advocating greater "fusion" of common law and equity, including with
respect to "monetary remedies for civil wrongs").
45. See Banerjee, supra note 6, 25.46 (observing that Millett L.J. "noted
that 'not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty' and
referred to similar observations in decisions from Canada and Australia").
46. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, at 16 (quoting Southin J. in Girardet v. Crease &
Co. (1987) 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 361, 362).
47. Id. (quoting La Forest J. in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Res. Ltd.
(1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 28); see also Miller, supra note 6, at 256-59, 269-70,
281. But see id. at 281-85 (arguing that there is "a plausible case for
recognition of a fiduciary duty of care" based on fiduciary-specific application of
the care concept, but acknowledging that "significant inconsistencies and
prevailing uncertainty in [Canadian] law make it somewhat artificial to speak
of a fiduciary duty of care of general application").
48. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, at 17 (quoting Ipp J. in Permanent Bldg. Soc'y v.
Wheeler (1994) 14 A.C.S.R. 109, 158). Definitions of the fiduciary relationship
typically emphasize discretionary power to affect another's interests and a
correlative vulnerability of the other party. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 262
(arguing that "a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party (the fiduciary)
enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another
(the beneficiary)" (emphasis omitted)).
49. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, at 17. It is interesting to note that the
Companies Act 2006 includes no BJR-an omission that Paul Davies attributes
to an expectation of the law commissions that courts would "be alive to the
probability that they are better at dealing with conflicts of interest than with
the assessment of business risks and to the desirability of avoiding the luxury of
substituting the courts' hindsight for the directors' foresight." DAVIES, supra
note 6, at 493-94; see also Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 A.T.K. 400, 405, [1742]
Eng. Rep. 642, 644 (Ch.) (remarking that "it is by no means just in a judge, after
bad consequences have arisen from such executions of their power, to say that
they foresaw at the time what must necessarily happen; and therefore were
1036 [Vol. 48
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At this point, I must step back to remind the reader that, while
the distinction drawn between duties of care and loyalty in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada offers the simplicity and
analytical clarity that I argue Delaware law ought to pursue, one
has to be very careful about advocating wholesale adoption of
foreign regulatory models and legal structures, even among legal
systems and business cultures as similar as those discussed here.
Simply put, context matters-a point that I have explored elsewhere
at some length50 and to which I return below.51  For present
purposes, however, the modest threshold points are simply that a
well-functioning corporate legal system need not conceptualize the
duty of care as "fiduciary" in nature, and that distinguishing
between duties of care and loyalty in this manner may offer
discernible benefits through greater analytical clarity.
Indeed, the view outlined above has its proponents in the
United States as well. William Gregory, for example, argues that
the "duty of care is a negligence concept quite unlike the duty of
loyalty"-in part by reference to Millett's opinion in Mothew-and
concludes that equating them is "bad law and worse semantics."52
More generally, Deborah DeMott argues that we ought to
"distinguish between the fiduciary obligation as it applies to parties
within corporations and other duties that may be owed to a
corporation that are not distinctively fiduciary in character."53 The
director's duty of care, she explains, "is not distinctively fiduciary,"
as "many persons, by virtue of the law or their own contractual
undertakings, owe duties of care to other persons with whom they
have nonfiduciary relationships."54 In this spirit, Gordon Smith-in
developing his "critical resource" theory of fiduciary duty-clarifies
that by "fiduciary duty," he means solely "a duty of loyalty."5 5 The
term "fiduciary duty," Smith explains, "connotes an obligation to
refrain from self-interested behavior that constitutes a wrong to the
beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary exercising discretion with
respect to the beneficiary's critical resources."56 The duty of care, by
contrast, is not distinctly "fiduciary," insofar as "the intensity of the
guilty of a breach of trust"); Graham, supra note 6, 24.11 (observing that "our
courts already traditionally decline to review commercial decisions made by
directors in good faith").
50. See generally BRUNER, supra note 5.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. See William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion of
Words, 38 AKRON L. REV. 181, 183-88 (2005) (discussing the Mothew decision
and endorsing its analytical approach).
53. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915.
54. Id.
55. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1406-11 (2002).
56. Id. at 1407.
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duty of care is not dependent on whether the person is acting as a
fiduciary."57
In this light, the relatively stark contrast drawn above between
the approach taken in the United States, on the one hand, and that
taken in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, on the other,
must be relaxed somewhat, because a more embracing view of the
law of business organization in the United States reveals some
variability in conceptual treatment of the duty of care. For example,
while partnership law and corporate law style the duty of care a
"fiduciary" duty,5 8 agency law does not. The Restatement (Third) of
Agency provides that "[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally
for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship." 59 This characterization of loyalty _as the singular
fiduciary duty is reinforced by contrast with the duty of care, which
the Restatement (Third) describes as a "duty of performance."60 The
Restatement (Third) provides that "an agent has a duty to the
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally
exercised by agents in similar circumstances,"61 omitting the
"fiduciary" descriptor. The conceptual distinction is underscored,
then, in explanatory materials; one comment notes that the "general
fiduciary principle complements and facilitates an agent's
compliance with duties of performance," 62 while a reporter's note
observes of the "duties of care, competence, and diligence" that these
"are duties of performance, not duties of loyalty."6 3
The upshot is that, while the duty of care is widely described as
a "fiduciary" duty in the United States, U.S. business organization
law is in fact not entirely consistent regarding its status, and U.S.
legal scholars continue to hold differing views on the matter. Put
differently, characterizing the director's duty of care as a "fiduciary"
duty is a choice and would appear to be no more inevitable in the
United States than elsewhere.
57. Id. at 1406-07, 1409. Cf. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 169-70 (2011)
(characterizing enforcement of the duty of care as "weaker" and "less strict"
than enforcement of the duty of loyalty); DeMott, supra note 53, at 921-23
(emphasizing the freedom to exculpate director liability for care breaches but
not loyalty breaches).
58. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (clarifying that
"the duties of care and loyalty," unlike "good faith," are fiduciary duties);
REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997) ("The only fiduciary duties a partner
owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).").
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 8.08.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 8.01 cmt. b.
63. Id. § 8.08 Reporter's note b. The emphasis placed on this distinction
presumably reflects Deborah DeMott's influence as Reporter. See Deborah A.
DeMott, DUKE LAW, http://law.duke.edulfac/demott (last visited Sept. 18, 2013)
(noting that DeMott served in this capacity); see also DeMott, supra note 53.
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III. CARE, LOYALTY, AND THE BJR
How has the choice to conceptualize the director's duty of care
as a "fiduciary" duty affected the emergence and evolution of
Delaware's doctrinal structure? The answer appears to be: quite
substantially.
A "fiduciary duty of care" was effectively a prerequisite to the
events described above, facilitating the conflation of care and loyalty
brought about by Delaware's oddly phrased BJR.64 Until the 1980s,
it was widely accepted that breach of the directors' duty of care in
the exercise of business judgment simply could not give rise to
monetary damages, 65 and, to the degree any practical utility could
be ascribed to the articulation of a "business judgment rule," it
served as a convenient shorthand for this principle. In Shlensky v.
Wrigley,66 for example, the Appellate Court of Illinois in 1968
famously refused to second-guess a business decision "properly
before directors" (i.e., a decision not to install lights and play night
games at Wrigley Field) short of a showing of "fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest in their making of that decision."67
Delaware, for its part, has long framed the BJR as a
"presumption," but early formulations did so in a manner suggesting
that only disloyalty could give rise to monetary damages. For
example, in 1928, the Court of Chancery wrote the following:
The directors are chosen to pass upon such questions [of
business policy] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted
with fraud is accepted as final. The judgment of the directors
of corporations enjoys the benefit of a presumption that it was
formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best
interests of the corporation they serve. 68
By the mid-1980s, as noted above, the perception of the
marketplace remained that monetary liability could not be imposed
upon a director short of disloyalty,69 although in retrospect we can
see that by this time, the formulation of Delaware's BJR had
changed in subtle but important respects. Again, in Aronson, the
Delaware Supreme Court characterized the BJR as "a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
64. Recall, by way of contrast, that the United Kingdom rejected adoption
of a formal BJR in its company law reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s, but
that this appears to have been motivated by a long-established posture of
nonreview of good faith business decisions in the British courts-an informal
position resembling that formalized historically through the BJR in the United
States. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1139-44.
66. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
67. Id. at 780.
68. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928),
quoted in Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779.
69. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1139-44.
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acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."70
Notwithstanding the formal similarity-each iteration styling
the BJR a "presumption" in the directors' favor-the latter differs in
expressly referring to matters implicating both care and loyalty. As
opposed to articulating the presumption in a manner suggesting
that monetary liability could be imposed only upon a showing of
disloyalty, as the earlier formulation had, the Aronson formulation
simultaneously suggested that the BJR could be overcome solely by
reference to the quality of board decision making, and-just as
troublingly-tended to suggest that the duties of care and loyalty
were themselves intrinsically linked with one another in some deep
manner embodied in, or subsumed by, the BJR itself.
The latent potential for the Aronson formulation to permit
damages solely by reference to the quality of board decision making
would, as discussed above, materialize in Van Gorkom, 71 and
likewise the latent potential for this strange BJR formulation to give
rise to confusion regarding the nature of care and loyalty duties-
and their relationship to one another-would ultimately materialize
in the Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 72 saga. In Cede, the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected the Chancellor's ruling that plaintiffs
seeking damages for breach of the duty of care would have to
establish not only a breach of duty but also that the breach
proximately caused a loss.7 3 The Chancellor's approach, applying
traditional negligence-based analysis derived from long-standing
"tort principles,"7 4 was characterized by the Delaware Supreme
Court as "rewriting the Delaware business judgment rule's
requirement of due care."7 5  Carrying the latent potential for
confusion embedded in the Aronson formulation to its logical
extreme, the Cede court fully subsumed the duties of care and
loyalty within the BJR, depicting the BJR itself as the primary
embodiment of the rigors of "fiduciary" status, with care and loyalty
alike relegated to secondary status as mere reflections of the BJR.
The court lumped together "good faith, loyalty [and] due care" as
means of overcoming the BJR,76 clearly conceptualizing these duties
as expressions of a fundamental and singular fiduciary concept
70. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (emphasis added),
overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
71. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-93 (Del. 1985), overruled
on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
72. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified on reh'g, 636 A.2d 956; see also DALE
A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONs 353-54 (4th ed. 2012)
(describing "the many bad opinions in the horrific [Cede] litigation," which
ultimately became "one of the longest trials in Delaware court history").
73. Cede, 634 A.2d at 366-71.
74. Id. at 369.
75. Id. at 371.
76. See id. at 361.
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embodied more holistically by the BJR itself.7 7 The court explained
that "[d]uty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks
of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation
and its stockholders," and characterized the duty of care itself as a
mere "element of the business judgment rule" embodied by the
Aronson requirement that the board inform itself.78 In this light,
the court characterized the Chancellor's requirement of proximate
cause as an unprecedented hurdle to rebuttal of the BJR,79 arriving
at the remarkable conclusion that breach of the duty of care-with
no showing of resulting injury-rebuts the BJR and "requires the
directors to prove that the transaction was entirely fair," the
standard typically applied in the duty of loyalty context.80 The court
then went on to "emphasize" the consequence of this move with
respect to remedies-the availability of "rescissory damages" (or any
other form of equitable or monetary relief deemed "appropriate" by
the Chancellor).81
As Lyman Johnson would observe of this holding, "none of the
authority cited . .. supports the novel proposition that, in a duty of
care case, a director must carry the burden of proving the entire
fairness of a challenged transaction"82-a burden that was,
ironically enough, found to have been met in the end.83 Johnson
77. Cf. Gregory, supra note 52, at 190 ("The astonishing innovation of the
Delaware Supreme Court [in Cede] is to destroy the distinction between
intentional conduct and negligent conduct.").
78. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 367; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(b),
8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B) (2010) (tending to reduce the duty of care to a duty to inform
oneself via the BJR); Johnson, supra note 10, at 794-95 (observing that this
approach "diminishes" the duty of care by "making that core concept
coextensive with the informedness element found in Aronson's flawed (but oft-
cited) formulation" of the BJR).
As Lyman Johnson observes, the fact that Delaware's BJR predated
any clear articulation of a director's duty of care set the stage for this move in
Cede. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 8-9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=2277645; see also sources cited supra note 10. Note, however, that
it remains coherent to conceptualize the duty of care as analytically prior to the
BJR today. See Johnson, supra (manuscript at 24) (emphasizing that the BJR
is better conceptualized as an "an aspect of duty of care review"); id.
(manuscript at 27) (suggesting that the BJR presumption "presupposes that
directors are behaving carefully and loyally, without expressly stating it just
that way").
79. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 368-69.
80. Id. at 370-71.
81. Id. at 371.
82. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 799-801.
83. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179-80 (Del.
1995) (finding that, on remand, the "Court of Chancery meticulously considered
and weighed each aspect of fair dealing and fair price," and that the record
supported the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the transaction was entirely
fair, representing "the highest price reasonably available" in the merger at
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rightly observes that "the business judgment rule is ill-equipped to
serve as the umbrella concept for analytically linking director
duties . . . with standards of judicial review," being a "narrower"
concept than the duties themselves. 84 Indeed, as discussed above,
the duty of loyalty and the BJR, properly understood, quite literally
have nothing to do with one another. In Cede, the Delaware
Supreme Court suggested that the duties of care and loyalty alike
represent procedural means of "rebut[ting] the presumption that the
directors have acted in the best interests of the shareholders," and
this unity-born of their twin status as "the traditional hallmarks of
a fiduciary"-forms the conceptual foundation for the court's
conclusion that breach of either duty should trigger the same
procedural, analytical, and remedial consequences.85 But the duty
of loyalty is in fact quite awkwardly styled as a means of overcoming
the BJR; it would be more historically accurate and conceptually
coherent to say that the BJR is simply inapposite to loyalty
problems in much the same way that the BJR is inapposite to cases
not involving an exercise of business judgment. In such cases, the
BJR has no application and straightforwardly provides no
protection.86 Regardless, however, the fundamental flaw motivating
the Cede analysis persists in Delaware and elsewhere.87
In order to perceive more clearly the role of the "fiduciary" label
in facilitating the emergence of this doctrinal structure, it may help
to pause at this point to approach the matter through a
counterfactual: Could the Delaware Supreme Court conceivably
have reached the conclusion it did in Cede without having styled
care a "fiduciary" duty? It is difficult to imagine how the court could
issue). Note that § 102(b)(7) could not protect the Technicolor directors from
this mess because the operative events occurred before § 102(b)(7) was enacted.
See id. at 1165 n.17.
84. Johnson, supra note 10, at 802-03 ("Both the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty govern corporate directors whether or not directors make business
decisions, while the business judgment rule applies only when directors do
make such decisions.").
85. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 367, 371.
86. Compare Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch.
1996) ("The business outcome of an investment project that is unaffected by
director self-interest or bad faith cannot itself be an occasion for director
liability. That is the hard core of the business judgment doctrine."), with
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the BJR
applies only to directors' actions, not "where directors have either abdicated
their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act"), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). See also Velasco, supra
note 36, at 1306, 1314-17 (observing that before Cede, the BJR applied to care
claims while the entire fairness standard applied to loyalty claims, and
advocating that Delaware abandon the Cede approach and return to the
"traditional model").
87. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994) (similarly conflating care and loyalty as "a duty
to the corporation," in the singular).
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have done so. Critically, each step of the court's analysis rests
fundamentally on this conceptual foundation: (1) conflating duties of
care and loyalty as "the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who
endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its
stockholders";88 (2) restyling the BJR itself as the embodiment of
that singular fiduciary concept, with care and loyalty breaches alike
reduced to means of overcoming the BJR; and (3) concluding that,
because care and loyalty breaches are similarly just means of
overcoming the BJR's presumption of fiduciary rectitude, the
procedural consequences and remedies in each instance must be the
same. Not one of these steps could logically be taken without first
conceptualizing care as a "fiduciary" duty, rendering it difficult to
imagine that Delaware's present doctrinal structure could have
arisen had care not been conceptualized this way.
From a pragmatic perspective, the fundamental problem with
Delaware's conflation of care and loyalty is that it impedes
recognition of the fact that these duties address different problems
with different moral valences, calling for different enforcement
regimes. Historically, the duty of loyalty has been more
aggressively enforced in order to deter conflicts of interest, a policy
premised on the implicit, and quite valid, empirical assumption that
the actor in question will generally be well positioned to minimize
his or her own liability exposure by conscientiously policing the
nature of his or her own undertakings. In the agency context, for
example, in Tarnowski v. Resop89 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
justified disgorgement of secret profits-regardless of injury-with
the observation that "[a]ctual injury is not the principle the law
proceeds on, in holding such transactions void. Fidelity in the agent
is what is aimed at, and, as a means of securing it, the law will not
permit him to place himself in a position in which he may be
tempted by his own private interests."90  Similarly, in the
partnership context, then-Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals Benjamin Cardozo famously explained in Meinhard v.
Salmon91 that a joint venturer owed his "coadventurer" a duty of
disclosure regarding a new opportunity arising from the venture and
that the "price of its denial" was that the new opportunity would be
held in trust "at the option and for the benefit of the one whom he
excluded"-regardless of the likelihood that such disclosure "would
have been of little value even if seasonably offered."92 Similarly, in
Guth v. Loft, Inc.,93 the Delaware Supreme Court explained that
88. Cede, 634 A.2d at 367.
89. 51 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1952).
90. Id. at 803 (emphasis added) (quoting Lum v. McEwen, 57 N.W. 662, 663
(Minn. 1894)).
91. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
92. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
93. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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"[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests,"
standing "in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders." 94 As a consequence of this duty of loyalty, the court
explained that
[i]f an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law
charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of
the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer
all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow
ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a
betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise
public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation,
extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of
the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.95
In each case, a clear policy of deterrence-predicated upon an
empirical assumption that scrupulous fiduciaries could realistically
avoid such difficulties and a correlative moral stigma associated
with breach-facilitated more aggressive enforcement of the duty of
loyalty. 96 As Douglas Branson has expressed it, "the duty of loyalty
deals with purposeful conduct of a venal, opportunistic sort," such
that in "the common law hierarchy of fault, duty of loyalty violations
rank high."9 7
94. Id. at 510.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Cf. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 46-63), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract
=2167883 (characterizing fiduciary power as "a means" belonging to the
beneficiary, giving rise to an "implied entitlement" to gains from the exercise of
that power, such that disgorgement "restores to the beneficiary gains to which
she was entitled"); Smith, supra note 55, at 1494-95 (arguing that the
"beneficiary becomes entitled to the fiduciary's loyalty when the fiduciary
exercises discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical resources," and that
remedies vindicating "the beneficiary's entitlement may in some cases exceed
the beneficiary's actual loss"); Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship 10-15
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that "fiduciary
power is distinguishable from other varieties of power by virtue of the fact that
it is a form of authority ... derived from the legal personality of another").
97. Branson, supra note 17, at 384. While corporate statutes may insulate
interested director transactions from heightened scrutiny when approved by
disinterested parties or otherwise shown to be "fair"-for example, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2012)-this does not reflect tolerance of self-dealing so much
as pragmatic recognition that insiders may occasionally offer their companies
better terms than outsiders would. Prohibiting interested director transactions
outright would come at "the cost of deterring some mutually beneficial
transactions, as when directors are more confident about a corporation's
prospects than are banks or outside investors." WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL.,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BuSINESS ORGANIZATION 300 (2nd ed.
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In duty of care cases, on the other hand, we have historically
seen exactly the opposite-weak enforcement premised on the
express, and equally valid, empirical assumption that the actor in
question could not manage his or her own liability exposure in so
straightforward a manner, simultaneously diminishing the moral
stigma associated with breach and raising the prospect of
detrimental risk aversion. Then-Chancellor Allen-presumably
responding to the bewildering doctrinal structure created by the
Delaware Supreme Court in the Cede litigation 98-strongly
emphasized these dynamics in two subsequent opinions issued just a
year after the Cede litigation concluded. In Gagliardi v. TriFoods
International, Inc.99-a 1996 opinion citing neither Aronson's
formulation of the BJR nor the framework established in the Cede
litigation-Allen endeavored to resurrect the stronger historical
articulation of the BJR to the effect that the "business outcome of an
investment project that is unaffected by director self-interest or bad
faith cannot itself be an occasion for director liability."100 In support
of this approach, he argued that "[t]he rule could rationally be no
different" because if corporate directors
were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky project
on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly
risky! stupidly risky! egregiously risky!-you supply the
adverb), their liability would be joint and several for the whole
loss (with I suppose a right of contribution). Given the scale of
operation of modern public corporations, this stupefying
disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors
threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a
very small probability of director liability based on
"negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc., could induce a board
to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! 101
The BJR, in Allen's formulation, responds to this threat of risk
aversion, insulating directors and shareholders alike from "the
uneconomic consequences that the presence of such second-guessing
risk would have on director action and shareholder wealth."102
2007). Consequently, the "evolution of fiduciary law of director self-dealing
mirrors the interplay among these competing goals." Id.
98. Note that it was Allen's effort to require proof of injury that the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected in this litigation. See Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. CV-8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *582 (Del. Ch. June 24,
1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345
(Del. 1993).
99. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
100. Id. at 1051.
101. Id. at 1052.
102. Id.; see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAw 128 (2d ed. 2009)
(observing that rescissory damages in a duty of care case "would have the effect
of ordering the defendant directors to return a benefit that they never received"
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In his In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litigation opinion
later that year, Allen reiterated this argument and emphasized the
resulting analytical and moral distinction between care and loyalty
breaches.103 Allen observed that if directors "are to be adjudged
personally liable for losses on the basis of a substantive judgment
based upon what persons of ordinary or average judgment and
average risk assessment talent regard as 'prudent' 'sensible' or even
'rational', such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to
authorize less risky investment projects." 104 In this case, however,
he carried the analysis a step further, adding that "one wonders on
what moral basis might shareholders attack a good faith business
decision of a director as 'unreasonable' or 'irrational."' 0 5  He
continues, quoting from Barnes v. Andrews' 0 6-the case upon which
Allen had based the approach to care analysis rejected by the
Delaware Supreme Court in the Cede litigation-where Judge
Learned Hand stated that directors "are the general advisors of the
business and if they faithfully give such ability as they have to their
charge, it would not be lawful to hold them liable."10 7 While sharply
contrasting with the approach endorsed by the Delaware Supreme
Court in the Cede litigation, Allen's 1996 opinions in Gagliardi and
Caremark nicely express the logic of the historical approach to the
BJR as well as the analytical and moral distinction leading courts to
adopt very different approaches to care and loyalty breaches.108
and further "threaten to be so astronomical as to substantially chill the
decisionmaking process").
103. See generally In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959
(Del. Ch. 1996).
104. Id. at 967-68 n.16.
105. Id. at 968.
106. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
107. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968 (emphasis added) (quoting Barnes, 298
F. at 618).
108. See also FRANKEL, supra note 57, at 169-73 (providing a similar
explanation of why enforcement of the duty of care has historically been
"weaker" and "less strict" than enforcement of the duty of loyalty); Branson,
supra note 17, at 384 n.42 ("Ironically, with duty of care claims the fault may be
small yet the damages may be great, out of all proportion to the fault
involved.... In duty of loyalty cases, the fault may be regarded as severe but
the damages for which the director is held accountable may be relatively
limited. . . ."); cf. Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14 (7th Cir. 1989) (indicating
that the BJR applies in the partnership context "just as it would" in the
corporation context); REvISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(c) (1997) (limiting the duty
of care in the partnership context to "refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of
law"). While there are, to be sure, circumstances where courts have embraced
more robust enforcement of the duty of care, this has generally been limited to
banking cases, reflecting deep concerns regarding the social costs of excessive
risk taking in this unique context. See Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of
Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 36 SEA'TLE U. L. REV. 527,
538-40, 545-46 (2013).
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While analysis of oversight failures through the conceptual lens
of "good faith" might seem to be in tension with the binary
enforcement structure described above-insofar as good faith itself
is conceptualized as a component of the duty of loyalty, yet
application of the rigorous Caremark standard effectively undercuts
enforcement in a manner resembling the traditional approach to the
duty of care' 09-the tension is in fact illusory. As I have explored in
prior work, good faith is fundamentally about state of mind-the
quality of a director's intentions vis-A-vis the company. 1 0 This is
the core of the argument for conceptualizing good faith as a
component of the duty of loyalty.11' The practical problem, however,
is that the quality of intentions can be exceedingly difficult to judge
in oversight cases where (by hypothesis) the plaintiffs' allegations
involve failures to act. In essence, application of the Caremark
standard to oversight cases has the effect of permitting good faith to
be conceptualized (properly, in my view) as a component of loyalty
while limiting the availability of associated remedies to those
circumstances sufficiently egregious to permit an inference of bad
intentions vis-A-vis the company-specifically, circumstances where
there is total board failure to engage in oversight.112
Having observed that conflation of the duties of care and loyalty
as reflections of a singular, underlying "fiduciary" concept has
resulted in a tendency toward overenforcement of the corporate
director's duty of care, one might naturally ask whether such
conflation has similarly resulted in a tendency toward
underenforcement of the director's duty of loyalty. Indeed, looking
beyond corporate law, there is ample evidence of the erosion of
loyalty in the law of business organization more generally. The
109. Note that oversight cases have traditionally been treated as duty of
care cases in other jurisdictions and were so treated in Delaware itself until
relatively recently. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824-
26 (N.J. 1981); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. Only with the Delaware
Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Ritter would it be firmly established that
oversight cases-via the good faith inquiry undertaken in Caremark-would be
treated by Delaware courts as implicating the duty of loyalty. See supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Bruner, supra note 1; see also Bruner, supra note 19.
111. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1137.
112. See id. at 1180-82, 1184-86; Bruner, supra note 19, at 589-91. Julian
Velasco has explored the intriguing possibility that treating good faith and
"traditional loyalty" as reflections of a single duty might create pressure toward
a single standard of review, such that "good faith would be overenforced and
loyalty would be underenforced"-a concern resembling that raised in this
Essay regarding conflation of care and loyalty as reflections of a singular,
underlying "fiduciary" concept. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1293-94. While
Velasco's concern is well taken, to date there would appear to be little evidence
of such pressure-presumably because the Caremark standard has so decisively
circumscribed the substantive scope of good faith claims. See, e.g., Bruner,
supra note 19, at 589-91.
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Revised Uniform Partnership Act, for example, limits the scope of
the duty of loyalty' 1 3 and then expressly permits further carve-outs
in the partnership agreement to the extent "not manifestly
unreasonable."'1 4 The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act similarly permits contractual limitation of the duty of loyalty
through the operating agreement," 5 while Delaware goes even
further, permitting "fiduciary duties" to be "expanded or restricted
or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company
agreement."116 Naturally, then, one wonders what fate awaits the
corporate director's duty of loyalty and how inhabiting the singular
"fiduciary" vessel with the duty of care may affect its fortunes.
This broader trend toward relaxing the duty of loyalty reflects,
in substantial part, the ascendance of the "law and economics"
movement. Specifically, the "contractarian" approach to business
firms effectively aims (as the moniker implies) to collapse the
entirety of the law of business organization into contract, styling
duties of care and loyalty alike as mere gap fillers to be employed
sparingly where contracts remain imperfectly specified due to the
complexity of the firm's undertakings. Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel, in their 1991 book The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, assert that "[i]f contracts can be written in enough
detail, there is no need for 'fiduciary' duties as well."117 On this
view, the "fiduciary principle" constitutes "an alternative to
elaborate promises and extra monitoring."1 8 This, of course, is a
long way from the robust duty of loyalty contemplated historically in
the cases cited above.119  Loyalty, on the contractarian view,
amounts to little more than a "default" rule that the parties ought to
be free to "waive"120-and the degree to which this relegationl2' has
113. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 404(b)(1) (1997) (limiting the partner's duty
of loyalty to accounting for benefits received through the partnership's business
or property, refraining from "dealing with the partnership," and refraining from
"competing with the partnership").
114. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i); see also id. § 103(b)(4) (similarly permitting the
parties to "reduce the duty of care," but not "unreasonably").
115. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 110(d)(1), 409(b) (2006)
(permitting parties to "restrict or eliminate" enumerated aspects of the duty of
loyalty if "not manifestly unreasonable"); see also id. § 110(d)(3) (similarly
permitting the parties to "alter the duty of care").
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
117. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 90 (1991).
118. Id. at 92.
119. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in
Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 546-50 (1997).
121. For arguments more broadly challenging the equation of fiduciary law
with contract law, see FRANKEL, supra note 57, at 229-39; DeMott, supra note
53, at 885-908; and Smith, supra note 55, at 1428-29.
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been premised on a singular "fiduciary" concept has not received
sufficient attention.
While the duty of loyalty has, to date, remained quite a bit more
robust in corporate law than it has in other areas, 122 efforts to
render the corporate duty of loyalty waiveable have been advanced
on multiple occasions since the 1980s, and, tellingly, these efforts
have expressly aimed to blur the distinction between care and
loyalty as a means of deflating the heightened moral valence
historically associated with loyalty breaches. For example, Douglas
Branson recounts that at a May 1986 meeting of the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), Frank Easterbrook argued that a draft provision of
the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance should be interpreted
to permit a corporation to "amend its articles of incorporation to
exempt that corporation's directors and officers from all or part of
the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty."123 As Branson (writing in
1988) would observe, this effort to render the corporate duty of
loyalty waiveable arose around the same time that exculpation
statutes began to sweep the country, and the contractarian strategy
was effectively to blur the conceptual distinction between care and
loyalty in order to extend to the latter duty the contractual
flexibility newly afforded in the case of the former.124
Notwithstanding the "sharp differences in treatment of the two
duties" historically, "Chicago School law and economics
scholars ... discern a difference in degree but not in quality between
conduct the duty of care regulates and conduct the duty of loyalty
governs. In economic terms, the distinction between fiduciary duties
is thought to be strained."125 Branson then identifies the strategic
opportunity that the rise of exculpation statutes presented to
contractarians: "A majority of states' corporation laws permit a
corporation, or a majority of its shareholders, to dispense with the
liability of corporate officials to the corporation for violations of the
duty of care. Under the economic analysis, then, the law also should
permit opting out of applicability of the duty of loyalty."126
While the corporate director's duty of loyalty has, to date,
withstood the contractarian "assault" (as Branson described it in the
late 1980s),127 contractarians have continued to attack the analytical
and moral distinctions historically drawn between care and loyalty
in an effort to undermine aggressive enforcement of the duty of
loyalty-an effort involving conflation of the two duties through a
122. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (barring exculpation
of damages for loyalty breaches).
123. See Branson, supra note 17, at 378-80 (paraphrasing Easterbrook).
Branson himself attended the meeting in question. See id. at 378 n. 14.
124. See id. at 380-85.
125. Id. at 384.
126. Id. at 383-84.
127. See, e.g., id. at 380-85.
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singular "fiduciary" concept. Easterbrook and Fischel, writing in
1991, support their argument for fully waiveable duties of care and
loyalty in part by reference to the BJR, which broadly "reflects
limits on the use of liability rules to assure contractual
performance."128 Lest the reader think that this argument might
apply with particular force to the duty of care, however, they
emphasize that, "[u]ltimately, . . . there is no sharp line between the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.... Both are agency costs,
conflicts of interest in the economic sense, that reduce shareholders'
wealth."129 While they acknowledge that there may, as a practical
matter, be "differential payoffs from breach and policing," the
distinction is not a categorical one.130  "The duty of loyalty
supplements market penalties for breach," they conclude, "in those
situations where the market penalties themselves might be
insufficient." 131  Then, in a 1993 article titled Contract and
Fiduciary Duty, Easterbrook and Fischel take direct aim at the
moral distinction historically drawn between duties of loyalty and
care and further argue that "fiduciary" relations are in fact not
morally distinguishable from garden-variety contractual
relations. 132 "The duty of loyalty," they explain, merely "replaces
detailed contractual terms," and the "usual economic assessments of
contractual terms and remedies then apply." 133 The straightforward
consequence is that "[fjiduciary duties are not special duties; they
have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived
and enforced in the same way, as other contractual
undertakings." 134
In sum, the effort to conflate care and loyalty concepts
undergirds both the specific contractarian argument that capacity to
"opt out" of the duty of care through exculpation 35 ought to be
extended to the duty of loyalty, as well as the more general
contractarian argument that "fiduciary" relations are not
categorically distinguishable from arm's-length contractual
relations. As noted above, the duty of loyalty has retained greater
vitality in Delaware corporate law to date,136 and the Delaware
128. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 117, at 94.
129. Id. at 103.
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425, 425-28 (1993).
133. Id. at 427.
134. Id.; see also id. at 438.
135. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 17, at 380-81 (describing exculpation
statutes as permitting corporations to "opt out" of the duty of care); Velasco,
supra note 36, at 1256 (describing exculpation statutes as permitting
corporations to "contract around the duty of care if they choose").
136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (barring exculpation of
damages for loyalty breaches).
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Supreme Court has shown only limited receptivity to the
contractarian view of fiduciary duty in the corporate context. 137 In
light of the foregoing efforts, however, there is reason to believe that
permitting conflation of care and loyalty could, in the future,
contribute to underenforcement of the corporate director's duty of
loyalty in much the same manner that it has already contributed to
periodic overenforcement of the director's duty of care.
IV. "FIDUCIARY" DUTY ANALYSIS AND MONETARY DAMAGES
In stark contrast with other common law jurisdictions-where a
clearer analytical distinction between care and loyalty has helped to
preserve distinct enforcement regimes more appropriate to the
differing practical problems and degrees of moral culpability
encountered in each respective domain-in Delaware, the concepts
of care and loyalty have been conflated in a manner that has
rendered the duty of care framework incoherent and unworkable.
The result has been a periodic tendency toward overenforcement,
while at the same time creating traps for the unwary, inviting
wasteful litigation, and preserving potential for further pointless
swings of the pendulum. At the same time, there is reason to
believe that conflating care and loyalty could facilitate erosion of the
duty of loyalty in the future by obscuring the practical and moral
case for aggressive enforcement.
To reiterate a point well worthy of emphasis, I do not advocate
literal adoption of any particular regime or approach prevailing
elsewhere; the embeddedness of these doctrines in distinct legal
systems, business cultures, and political economies would render
such a project a fraught undertaking indeed. 138 The contrast drawn
here does, however, help to illuminate the role played by the
conflation of care and loyalty duties in bringing about Delaware's
muddled doctrinal structure, as well as the degree of analytical
clarity sacrificed in conceptualizing these duties as Delaware has.
The statutory damages rule that I urge the Delaware General
Assembly to adopt would go a long way toward achieving a more
coherent and workable enforcement regime for the duty of care and
137. In its 1993 Nixon v. Blackwell decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
declined to provide "judicially-created rules to 'protect' minority stockholders of
closely held Delaware corporations." 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
Specifically, the court rejected the notion that minority shareholders were
entitled to equal liquidity, quoting Easterbrook and Fischel for the proposition
that "[t]o say that fiduciary principles require equal treatment is to beg the
question whether investors would contract for equal or even equivalent
treatment." Id. at 1377 (quoting EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 117, at
110). The court urged would-be minority shareholders in closely held
corporations to exhibit greater foresight, explaining that "tools of good corporate
practice are designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity
to bargain for protection before parting with consideration." Id. at 1380.
138. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 13-27, 287-92.
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the duty of loyalty alike. By expressly permitting the imposition of
monetary damages for a director's loyalty breaches while foreclosing
such damages for care breaches, 139 the periodic tendency toward
overenforcement of care and the nascent potential for
underenforcement of loyalty would be arrested at the same time.
Clarifying that damages for breach of a director's duty of care are
simply unavailable would effectively eliminate the need for a BJR
(at least with respect to monetary liability)140 as well as the
associated temptation to conflate duties of care and loyalty and the
consequences of their breach. At the same time, a statutory
provision emphasizing their distinctiveness and endorsing a more
robust enforcement posture toward loyalty breaches would undercut
the contractarian conflation of both duties as mere "default" rules,
preventing erosion of the duty of loyalty. 141
Delaware corporate law would be well served by a clearer
analytical distinction between duties of care and loyalty and the
enforcement of each, but the question of whether the duty of care
ought to be reconceptualized in nonfiduciary terms would remain
open. The statutory damages rule that I advocate would not require
such a move and-the historical argument presented earlier in this
Essay notwithstanding-there would be quite legitimate reasons to
question the wisdom of such a move today. While the distinct
139. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1136.
140. Id. at 1177-78. While adoption of a statutory provision like that
advocated here would render the BJR superfluous in assessing monetary
liability exposure, courts might reasonably retain the BJR (or something like it)
in the context of injunctive proceedings to the degree that concerns regarding
institutional competence counsel nonreview of business decision making. See,
e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts recognize that
after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate
business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often
call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information.").
But see Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 78
(manuscript at 24-25, 31-32, 57) (arguing that the BJR amounts to "doctrinal
surplusage" better conceptualized as an aspect of care analysis).
141. Recall that the statutory provision advocated would define loyalty "to
include cases involving financial conflicts of interest, other improper personal
benefits, conscious malfeasance, and conscious nonfeasance," capturing in the
last of these categories the set of cases now viewed by the Delaware courts as
involving "bad faith omission." The loyalty concept, so defined, effectively
embraces all of the exceptions to exculpation listed in the present § 102(b)(7).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012); Bruner, supra note 1, at 1136-37,
1178-79. While not taken up here, to the extent that § 102(b)(7) itself
represents the current impediment to waiving the duty of loyalty in a Delaware
corporate charter, the statutory damages provision advocated here should
likewise expressly bar waiver in order to ensure continuity on this point. See,
e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALoTrI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16, at 4-119 (3d ed. 2009) ("The
boundaries of the duty of loyalty are increasingly important in light of Section
102(b)(7). . . .").
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origins, nature, moral valences, and instrumental logic of these
duties are certainly consequential, and while the arguments for
styling the duty of care differently would appear strong if we were
writing on a clean slate, the fact is that we are not writing on a
clean slate.
Even if monetary damages were expressly unavailable, there
might nevertheless be reason to believe that styling the duty of care
"fiduciary" in nature could enhance compliance, assuming (plausibly
enough) that the marketplace invests that label with heightened
significance. As Tamar Frankel has observed, "if law is earmarked
as a separate category, the importance of the problems it addresses
is highlighted." 14 2 This dynamic may loom particularly large with
usage of the "fiduciary" label, as "a moral taint of violating fiduciary
duties appears in many areas" of U.S. law-contrasting sharply with
the prevailing view of "contract breach as an amoral act."1 4 3 In this
light, calling the duty of care a "fiduciary" duty for decades and then
abruptly restyling it as something else might be misinterpreted by
the marketplace as a de facto demotion-undercutting compliance
stemming from motivations other than fear of monetary damages. 144
More generally, it must be acknowledged that we need not style
such legal concepts in any particular way simply because they were
styled that way in earlier times (or in other places). 145 Indeed, even
in other common law jurisdictions treating loyalty as the sole
fiduciary duty, there are those who question whether legal and
equitable remedies can in fact be so neatly and categorically
distinguished as the Mothew decision suggests,146 and, likewise,
whether there is truly nothing distinctly "fiduciary" about the duty
142. FRANKEL, supra note 57, at 235.
143. Id. at 238. Cf. Birks, supra note 44 (conceding that "[w]e might say
that [care] is not especially fiduciary" relative to loyalty, but arguing that "care
in the affairs of the beneficiary is the very heart of the trustee's obligation"). It
should be noted that the lower moral valence associated with contract breach is
unique to common law jurisdictions. As Frankel observes, in civil law
jurisdictions rejecting the bifurcation of "legal" and "beneficial" title to property,
effective fiduciary relationships can nevertheless be created through contract.
Tamar Frankel, Towards Universal Fiduciary Principles 6-10 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). "Civil Law contract is suitable
to cover fiduciary relationships," she explains, because "Civil Law contract rules
carry a high degree of moral requirements, and breach of contract by trusted
parties is considered highly immoral." Id.
144. Cf. Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 519, 523 (2012) (arguing that "fiduciary duty
standards of conduct are duties-fully binding on actors even when they are not
enforced"); see also id. at 555 (rejecting use of the term "aspirational" to describe
the duty of care because it "is highly suggestive of optionality, and possibly even
unachievability").
145. Cf. FRANKEL, supra note 57, at 240 (arguing that the origins of fiduciary
law are "not decisive today," as "the approaches and limitations of the past are
not necessarily appropriate today").
146. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 44.
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of care (or at least its application) in the context of fiduciary
relations.147 In this light, it behooves me to emphasize what is truly
at issue in designing a monetary liability regime for the specific
context of corporate law. What is required is a clear and effective
means of distinguishing the realm of loyalty breaches, where the
potential for monetary recovery from directors is to be favored, from
the realm of care breaches, where the potential for monetary
recovery from directors threatens to deliver more harm than good.
As I have explored above, this distinction flows from the very
different analytical and moral posture the director occupies in these
contrasting settings-and while the fiduciary/nonfiduciary
distinction drawn in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada
provides one mechanism by which this distinction may be
established and maintained, it is certainly not the only possibility.
A statutory damages provision of the sort advocated here would, I
submit, fit the bill nicely.
I accept the force of the foregoing arguments regarding
perceived demotion of the duty of care and do not consider the
statutory damages rule advocated here to be in tension with their
fundamental aims; a statutory damages rule need not alter the
articulation or conceptualization of the underlying duty itself.148
Indeed, a clear damages rule like that advocated here could actually
facilitate a more robust formulation of the underlying duty of care,
because articulation of a stronger standard of conduct would no
longer be muted or inhibited by risk-aversion concerns, or otherwise
impacted by interaction with the BJR.149
Were Delaware to continue treating both care and loyalty as
two reflections of some singular, underlying "fiduciary" concept,
however, the need would be all the more pressing for a statutory
provision clarifying the critical enforcement distinction discussed
here and foreclosing their conflation in a categorical manner. As the
foregoing analysis demonstrates, the costs of conflating the duties of
care and loyalty have been quite real, and without a statutory
response, the costs may well continue to rise.
147. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 281-85.
148. This would appear to be a corollary of Julian Velasco's argument that
"fiduciary duty standards of conduct are duties-fully binding on actors even
when they are not enforced." See Velasco, supra note 144, at 523.
149. Cf. Johnson, supra note 10, at 803-05 (arguing that subsuming the
duty of care within the BJR had the effect of diminishing the substantive duty
by "wrongly correlat[ing] the duty of due care with the informedness element of
the business judgment rule").
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